Many an observer has written Pakistan’s obituary. Whether or not it was ever a good idea, Pakistan has managed to survive the past six decades. Although ethnic and religious identity politics has routinely threatened its dismemberment, there remains no credible option but to make Pakistan work.

Few states have their very existence queried more often than Pakistan. Given that this strategically important country has become synonymous with terrorism and nuclear proliferation, that might not seem surprising. But such sentiments are not merely fodder for foreign observers eager to pontificate on the failings of the subcontinent’s first Islamic republic.

Pakistan’s chronic incapacity to adequately deliver the basics to most of its citizens has led many here to champion ethnic separatism or Islamist revolution. The hope is that these alternate visions of statehood will finally deliver the promises Pakistan has struggled to provide. It isn’t uncommon to hear Pakistanis, especially in the Punjabi heartland, speak of the need to move towards “Islamic” values to wash away the stain of rampant corruption, poverty and crime.

But concerted efforts to Islamise Pakistan have been breathtaking failures that have stoked these very same ills while exacerbating division. Islamic organisations, for instance, are afforded a range of tax and other exemptions that many cynically exploit to avoid government oversight or taxation. It isn’t uncommon for landlords to bribe district preachers to promote their agendas, like evicting Hindus or Christians from valuable real estate.

But a forced Islamic identity poses a deeper problem. It is impossible to agree on what it precisely means to be Muslim, let alone how to implement the mechanics of an Islamic state in modern times. Sadly, that hasn’t stopped successive Pakistan leaders from mobilising Islam as the signal marker of citizenship.

This has had particularly dire consequences for minorities and women. Legislative amendments from 1973 onwards turned non-Muslims and members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim sect into second-class citizens. In 1979, the law in effect categorised rape as a form of adultery, itself a punishable offence, unless the victims, invariably women and children, could produce four male witnesses to “prove” that rape had occurred.

Yet even such chauvinism has not satisfied the most ardent Islamists. The Pakistan Taliban movement, a Pashtun network of militants and activists, has looked to establish an ultra-conservative emirate along the tribal frontier with Afghanistan. But along with ceaseless attacks by Pakistan and US forces, its strict adherence to violent coercion over everything else has, unsurprisingly, failed to capture the popular imagination. Mainstream Islamist parties have consistently polled poorly in all general elections that major secular parties have been allowed to contest unmolested.

In contrast, ethnic identity politics has proved more resilient in Pakistan. The desperately impoverished and oppressed Balochi community have taken the most strident approach – many openly call for complete separation from Pakistan. But sections of the Pashtun, Sindhi and Urdu communities have also canvassed greater autonomy.

No expression of political aspiration has been more severely repressed by Pakistan’s security forces than ethnic nationalism. For Balochi, Pakhtun and Sindhi separatists, the consequences have been dire: disappearances and extra-judicial murder of activists, their relatives or perceived sympathisers has been rampant for decades, especially in Balochistan. Separatists too have been guilty of reprisal attacks, kidnappings and killings.

Going as it does against the very grain of Pakistan’s claim to be a home for the subcontinent’s Muslims, ethnic nationalism has been condemned by both Islamists and the elite as a mischievous attempt to destabilise the nation. In reality, it has always been a direct consequence of marginalisation. That is why Bengalis, incensed by systematic discrimination from Pakistan’s Punjab dominated institutions, fought to create Bangladesh in 1971. At political rallies in the Balochi, Pakhtun and Urdu-speaking slums of Karachi, you can hear the echoes of 1971 today.

But the idea that ethnic nationalism will unlock true freedom, or that Pakistan itself is an impediment to liberation, is a dangerous fantasy. Despite Pakistan’s failings, the alternatives are far worse than anything we have already faced. Just as importantly, the story of Pakistan is not monolithically negative.

Pakistan has weathered a remarkably savage civil war under very public pressure from the US, a country deeply mistrusted here. If anything, the war and its consequences have helped to unify the nation, be it through a shared experience of terrorism, the commitment of everyday Pakistanis to live their lives, or philanthropy for victims of this war.

Our country has developed a vibrant media and telecommunications industry, while civil institutions are at present more robust and accountable than ever before. A recent package of constitutional reforms will see greater autonomy given to the provinces. The president has been stripped of the powers, inherited from a past dictator, to dismiss national and provincial assemblies and appoint military chiefs and provincial governors.

Ordinary Pakistanis may not appreciate the reforms all that much, and who could blame them? Most continue to live in disgraceful poverty despite successive governments pledging, and failing, to alleviate their suffering.

Pakistan remains a deeply troubled land. But the concept of Pakistan is not at fault. At the core the problem has always been the elite’s exploitation of our divisions and resentments to avoid proper scrutiny of their abject disregard for the average Pakistani. We must learn to live with our differences, to compromise and express dissent in a constructive fashion. A commitment to genuinely accountable parliamentary democracy is the only viable platform for this in the foreseeable future.

[Article published in The Guardian at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/26/pakistan-ethnic-religious-identity-politics]